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Abstract 
The feeling of good or bad luck occurs whenever there is an 
emotion contrast between an event and an easily accessible 
counterfactual alternative. This study suggests that cognitive 
simplicity plays a key role in the human ability to experience 
good and bad luck after the occurrence of an event. 
Keywords: Kolmogorov complexity; simplicity; emotion; 
luck; probability; unexpectedness. 
Good Luck and Bad Luck  
Situations spontaneously associated with good luck or bad 
luck are an important source of emotion. They are frequent 
in daily life: missing (or catching) the train by five seconds, 
forgetting one‟s cell phone the very day one is late for an 
important appointment, finding a banknote on the ground, 
etc. They are heavily used in popular fiction, precisely to 
arouse emotion: the gun gets jammed just at the right (or 
bad) time, the heroine defuses the bomb just before it 
explodes, etc. Regarding oneself or someone else as lucky 
or unlucky on specific occasions may induce gratitude or 
guilt, and for those who downplay the role of chance, 
intense feelings of good or bad luck may strengthen 
supernatural beliefs (Teigen & Jensen, in press). Reasoning 
about good luck and bad luck may also significantly 
influence rational judgment (Roese, 1997; Wohl & Enzle, 
2003). 
The feeling of having good or bad luck is a clear-cut 
phenomenon. Different individuals have consistent views of 
which situations can be regarded as bad or good luck (what 
the present study will confirm). This ability therefore gives 
rise to a well-posed problem, worth investigating. Previous 
studies have identified various parameters that control the 
feeling of luck. These include physical or temporal 
closeness (Kahneman & Varey, 1990; Teigen, 1996; Roese, 
1997; Pritchard & Smith, 2004), deviation from norms and 
expectations (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), mutability of 
causes (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Byrne 2002, 2007) and 
controllability (Roese, 1997).  
Many authors have acknowledged the prime importance 
of counterfactuals in any situation that generates a strong 
feeling of good or bad luck. Individuals systematically go 
through thoughts such as “If only…” or “I almost…” when 
regarding situations as (un)lucky. The theoretical treatment 
of counterfactuals in general, and in emotional situations in 
particular, remains however complex, as a multitude of 
determining factors seem to be involved. 
The purpose of the present study is to propose a new 
perspective on the phenomenon, imported from two other 
scientific domains. One is the study of narrative relevance 
(Dessalles 2008a). Spontaneous conversations are replete 
with stories about (un)lucky episodes, and the laws of 
interestingness seem to apply to them. The other import is 
the mathematical notion of complexity, which is involved in 
several important cognitive phenomena (Chater 1999; 
Chater & Vitányi, 2001). 
After mentioning existing attempts to capture the 
good/bad luck phenomenon formally, I will briefly present 
the Simplicity Theory and its first predictions concerning 
our problem. I will then present a study that seems to corro-
borate those predictions. Then, I will consider situations in 
which individuals adopt causal thinking. The results and the 
scope of the theory will be discussed in a last section. 
Formal accounts of luck 
Various determining factors have been identified that 
control the intensity of luck. One of them is the low 
probability of the (un)lucky event s. According to Rescher 
(1995:211), the intensity of luck is given by L = E (1–p), 
where E measures the difference that the occurrence of s 
makes for the interests at stake, and p is its probability. This 
formula has two major drawbacks. First, contrary to 
intuition, it does not distinguish moderately unlikely 
outcomes from highly unlikely ones, as both would provide 
emotion roughly equal to u. Second, as pointed out by 
Teigen (2005), it fails to capture the crucial presence of a 
counterfactual. As shown by Teigen in various studies, the 
amplitude of (un)luck is controlled by the „distance‟ to an 
alternative outcome that would have provided an emotional 
contrast. Teigen (2005) represents these effects through the 
formula: L = u / D, where u is the difference in „utility‟ 
between the counterfactual s2 and the actual situation s1, 
whereas D represents the „distance‟ between s1 and s2. 
This formula makes predictions that are much closer to 
observation, and thus represents a significant progress in 
comparison with Rescher‟s initial proposal. It has, however, 
its limitations. First, the influence of low probability, as 
identified by Rescher, is lost. The problem is illustrated in 
figure 1, where the feeling of unluck after missing the 
winning sector (in color) in a wheel of fortune game is 
stronger in (b) than in (a). Second, the notion of „utility‟, 
imported from economics, does not account for situations of 
pure surprise („I almost got six on all dice‟). Third, the 
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notion of distance is not properly defined. Sitting next to a 
lottery winner doesn‟t make you feel unlucky; you might 
however feel unlucky to have played her winning numbers, 
but a week too soon. Lastly, Teigen‟s formula fails to 
capture one property of counterfactual s2 that contributes to 
(un)luck, namely its simplicity. In figure 1(c), the winning 
sectors (in color) of the wheel of fortune occupy the same 
area as in (a) and the distance to the landing site is the same 
in both cases. Judgment of bad luck is, however, stronger in 
(a) than in (c). This phenomenon, due to the greater 
complexity of the counterfactual in (c), is not predicted by 
Teigen‟s formula. 
 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Figure 1: Three examples of near miss 
 
We will propose an alternative account, based on 
Simplicity Theory. It can be formulated in an informal way: 
(Un)lucky events are situations that occurred despite of 
simple, easily accessible alternatives. 
Simplicity Theory 
Simplicity Theory (ST) (formerly called „Complexity Drop 
Theory‟) has been developed to predict how people select 
events worth to tell. It has applications in the study of 
spontaneous conversations, of narratives, of news, and in the 
definition of subjective probability (Dessalles, 2006; 
2008a). ST‟s main principle can be stated: 
Interesting situations are those which are ‘too’ simple. 
ST uses the notion of cognitive complexity, which is a 
slightly modified version of the mathematical notion know 
as Kolmogorov complexity. 
The complexity C(s) of a situation s is the size of the ideal 
minimal description of s that is available to the observer. 
(the last restriction is crucial for the notion to be useful in 
cognitive science). The concept is much less trivial than it 
seems at first sight, and has given rise to a growing 
literature since its definition in the years 1960.  
ST uses two notions of complexity. The second notion is 
generation complexity. 
Cw(s) is the minimal size of the parameters  
to be set for the ‘world’ w to generate situation s. 
To compute Cw(s) of a lottery draw, for instance, one adds 
up the descriptions of all drawn numbers, as the „world‟ (in 
this case, the lottery machine) had to „choose‟ them 
independently. Note that the notion refers, not to any 
objective world, but to the observer‟s perception of the 
world. ST‟s central notion is unexpectedness, noted U(s). 
 U(s) = Cw(s) – C(s) (1) 
A situation is unexpected if it is „too‟ simple, i.e. simpler 
to describe than to generate. In the lottery example, a 
„remarkable‟ lottery draw such as 22-23-24-25-26-27 is 
unexpected, since C is much smaller than Cw. It only 
requires to instantiate 22 and to mention that it is a 
continuous series. C thus spares five instantiations by 
comparison with Cw. Hence a strong feeling of 
unexpectedness if such a draw actually occurs (Dessalles 
2006). This definition of unexpectedness accounts for 
various cognitive abilities, such as the perception of 
coincidences (Dessalles, 2008b) and of interestingness 
(Dessalles, 2008a; Dimulescu & Dessalles, 2009) (see 
details on www.simplicitytheory.org). It is consistent with 
the observation that „contrast‟ (what we call 
unexpectedness) is more relevant than (standard) probability 
to explain surprise (Teigen & Keren, 2003).  
Complexity is usually linked to probability p0 thanks to 
the following formula p0=2
–Cw0, where w0 is a blank world 
(Solomonoff, 1978). This formula is, however, unsa-
tisfactory, as it assigns a virtually zero probability to most 
situations of daily life, as they depend on a huge quantity of 
parameters. If we replace the blank world w0 by the 
observer‟s model w of the actual „world‟, we get pw = 2
–Cw, 
which corresponds to the usual definition of „objective‟ 
probability. In a lottery, for instance, pw is the same for all 
draws. ST (Dessalles 2006) defines subjective probability p 
by subtracting cognitive complexity C from Cw. We get: 
 p = 2
–U
 (2) 
Hence the statement about unexpected events being „too‟ 
simple. In ST‟s framework, the concept of probability is a 
derived notion and should be replaced by the notion of 
unexpectedness to account for many aspects of cognition. 
To account for good luck and bad luck, we must say how 
emotion is related to simplicity (Dessalles, 2008a). Let‟s 
call E(s) the (always positive) intensity of the emotional 
experience caused by situation s. 
 E(s) = Eh(s) + U(s)  (3) 
Eh(s) is the hypothetical emotional intensity attached to 
the occurrence of s. It corresponds to a not unexpected 
experience (when U = 0). In many cases, Eh(s) = V(s), where 
V is a utility function. Events that were complex for the 
world to produce (Cw large) arouse more intense emotion 
when they occur, as they are more unexpected. Using (2), 
(3) can be rewritten: e(s) = eh(s)/p(s), where eh and e stand 
for non-logarithmic emotions. The cognitive complexity 
C(s) decreases E(s) in (3). It acts like an emotional „tax‟ 
paid for considering the event.
1
 
                                                          
1 In (2), U must remain positive. In (3), U may be negative, but 
E must be positive. These constraints can be used to define the 
relevance of events (Dessalles, 2008a). 
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If s is not an event, but an anticipated situation, the 
expected emotion can be expressed using utility function V: 
 Eh(s) = V(s) – U(s)  (4) 
The perspective of a situation that is complex for the 
world to produce (Cw large) arouses less emotion. In the 
non-logarithmic domain, equation (4) reads eh(s) = 
v(s)p(s). 
In causal reasoning, we suppose that expected emotion 
propagates through causal links (Dessalles 2008). If a 
known emotional situation s is believed to result from 
situation s', then Eh(s) = Eh(s'). Using conditional com-
plexity, we may write: 
 U(s) = U(s') + Cw(s|s’) (5) 
By adding Eh(s) to both sides, we get: 
 E(s') = E(s) – Cw(s|s’) (6) 
ST’s Predictions 
In the absence of any precise counterfactual, as when one‟s 
house is struck by lightning, (3) provides a definition of 
luck, in line with (Rescher 1995): 
 L1 = Eh(s1) + U(s1) (7) 
To assess the expected emotion Eh(s1) in such case, 
individuals may recall a known situation s of lightning on a 
house (or imagine it), and consider Eh(s1) = Eh(s) = L1(s) – 
U(s). 
In wheel of fortune situations, the expected emotional 
intensity Eh(s+) of winning corresponds to landing on a 
winning site s+. The colored segment in figure 2 represents 
the winning sector in a linear version of the wheel of 
fortune. The complexity of landing on s+ is Cw(s+) = log2 l0. 
This is the number of bits required by the „world‟ to choose 
a landing position. According to (4), the maximum value of 
Eh(s+) is obtained for typical, i.e. maximally complex s+: 
C(s+) = log2 l2. This is the number of bits required to 
discriminate among all winning positions. We get: 
 max Eh(s+) = V(s+) – log2 l0/l2 
This corresponds to the classical expected utility in the 
non-logarithmic domain.  
 
Figure 2: Discrete bounded near miss 
 
When playing with a wheel of fortune, individuals 
acknowledge that the probability of landing in various 
sectors of the roulette is constant, but that landing close to a 
winning sector involves more intense bad luck (Teigen, 
1996). Let us considered a linear version of the problem 
(figure 2). 
After the draw, possibly for (self-)narrative purposes, 
individuals pick the situation s that maximizes emotional 
intensity E(s). It may be the actual situation s1, as in (7), or a 
counterfactual one s2. Individuals are supposed to opt for the 
computation that gives the more intense emotion. In the 
counterfactual case, s1 is seen as an intermediary step 
toward s2. (3) and (6) give a new value for E(s1): 
Ec(s1) = Eh(s2) + U(s2) – Cwc(s2|s1). Luck is measured by the 
emotional gap between both emotions for s1: 
 L2 = Eh(s2|s1) + U(s2) – Cwc(s2|s1) (8) 
Conditional Eh(s2|s1) means that the expected emotional 
intensity is assessed using the actual emotional intensity of 
s1 as baseline. The counterfactual nature of s2 requires the 
introduction of a fictitious world wc that is able to keep a 
memory of s1 to generate s2. The term Cwc(s2|s1) is the 
minimal price to pay for the „If…‟. It represents the size of 
the minimal parameter modifications that the observer can 
imagine for the „world‟ to have generated s2 instead of s1. 
In the case of figure 2, Eh(s2|s1) = V(s+), and Cwc(s2|s1) = 
1+ log2(+), which is the amount in bits needed to indicate 
the (non zero) targeting shift to the right toward s2. On the 
other hand, Cw(s2) = log2 l0 and C(s2) = 1 + log2(1+) (one 
bit to choose the left edge of the winning region, plus the 
representation in bits of the (possibly null) shift to reach s2). 
We get: L2 = V(s+) + log2 l0 – log2(+)(1+) – 2. Taking 
 = 0 to maximize the intensity of unluck: 
 L2 = V(s+) + log2 l0/ – 2 (9) 
The experience of bad luck in this near miss experience is 
an increasing function of the missed opportunity V(s+) and 
of the number l0 of possibilities, and a decreasing function 
of the miss . 
If the counterfactual is assessed against the expected 
emotion, here max Eh(s+), instead of s1, we get:  
 L3 = V(s+) + log2 l2/ – 2 (10) 
This model accounts for the fact that when s2 is more 
complex, as in figure 1(c), the intensity of (un)luck is 
smaller. We have C(s2) = log2 k + 1 + log2(1+), where k is 
the number of winning regions. The intensity of luck is thus 
diminished by log2 k. 
The extension to the continuous case is straightforward 
(figure 3). We suppose that the space is bounded to the left 
but not to the right. If we call  the landing precision, then 
Cw(s2) = log2(l0/), as we need that number of bits to decide 
where to stop.
2
 As previously, Cwc(s2|s1) = log2(+)/, and 
C(s2) = log2(1+/). After taking the best choice  = 0, we 
get: 
 L2 = V(s+) + log2 l0/ – 1 (11) 
                                                          
2 This supposes that there is a way to delimit numbers in the 
algorithm. 
l0 
 
s1  s2 
 
l1 l2 
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(the one-bit difference with (9) comes from the fact that 
the winning region has only one edge). Equation (11) 
accounts for emotions described by the expression: “fall 
short of the goal”. 
 
Figure 3: Continuous unbounded near miss 
 
Equations (9) and (11) define the intensity of luck, but not 
only. They predict what the counterfactual situation s2 will 
be (what many models of counterfactual thinking omit to 
do). Individuals pick the alternative s2 that realizes the best 
compromise between high emotion E(s2) and low 
counterfactual complexity Cwc(s2|s1).  
Nine Stories 
The following experiment was conducted to validate the 
predictions of the model. We tested 61 participants who 
accepted to pass the test on a Web site 
(www.dessalles.fr/expe/histoires). All contacted individuals 
had a high level of academic education, though in domains 
different from psychology or language sciences (mainly 
students in engineering). Nine short stories were presented 
to them (see Table 1). Each involved two or three choices. 
Instructions invited participants to choose options that made 
emotion maximal. Some choices irrelevant to the present 
study (such as the age of the victim in story S9) have not 
been exploited. Answers given after less than 20 sec. of 
reading were automatically discarded (median answering 
time per story was 90 sec.), which leaves us with a 
minimum of 56 answers per story. Presentation order 
(stories and options) was randomized.  
 
Table 1: Abridged translation of the stories  
(originals on www.dessalles.fr/expe/histoires). 
 
S1- René is a railway worker. He works at the border, at a place 
where signals must me manually transmitted between the two 
networks. There is single-track line at [9 (71*) / 23 (21) / 15 (7)] 
km from René‟s post. That day, René forgot to send the signal as a 
train crossed the border. He eventually did, but [ten (59*) / fifty 
(21) / thirty (20)] seconds before that, another train had entered 
the single-track line. The collision killed one of the two drivers. 
S2- Lucas was heading for the metro station. At [30 (71*) / 100 
(20) / 800 (9)] m from the station, he stopped to lace up his shoe. 
As he arrived on the platform, the doors of the train closed in front 
of him. He had to wait [25 (89*) / 15 (9) / 6 (2)] minutes for the 
next train. 
S3- Michèle has been playing lotto every week for [6 (84*) / 4 (11) 
/ 2 (5)] years. On December [19 (70*) / 3 (18) / 12 (12)], she told 
[two (60*) / four (32) / three (9)] friends of hers that she would 
stop playing. They persuaded her to bet for the special Christmas 
draw, on December 26. She did and won 62 000 Euros. 
S4- Jacques was badly injured at his workplace by a defective 
machine on November 7. The defect had been previously notified 
and the machine was planned to be repaired on [November 8 (75*) 
/ November 17 (12) / December 18 (12)]. 
S5- Florence works in a biology lab. Her two-[year (84*) / month 
(11) / week (5)] experiment on cell cultures was ruined by a 
student who knocked over a shelf. This broke [all boxes 
containing (35) / a bottle of formalin that fell on (45) / the 
automatic device nourishing (20)] the cell cultures. Florence was 
furious. She discovered that the student was the son of [her 
neighbor (67*) / her former PE teacher (15) / the piano teacher 
of her sister (18)]. 
S6- A young writer is admitted to Magalie‟s emergency 
department at the hospital. Her condition deteriorates. [8 (66*) / 4 
(21) / 6 (14)] infectious agents may explain the illness. Magalie 
sends samples to the lab and tests are conducted in parallel. It takes 
[seven (79*) / three (16) / five (5)] hours to get the result and the 
patient is saved at the last minute. Magalie remembers that she saw 
the name of the virus in [the media, as well-know singer recently 
died of it (52*) / the record of another patient (28) / a 
specialized journal (21)]. 
S7- For [four months (76*) / two months (21) / two weeks (3)] I 
was thinking of changing my cell phone. I eventually went to SFR 
Thursday at 1pm. I had to pay part of it because I was lacking 1000 
points. [Thursday (74*) / Friday (21) / Tuesday (5)] evening, I 
received an offer: “change your phone, SFR offers you [1500 (55) / 
4000 (38) / 500 (7*)] points”. 
S8- Ms Tsuda‟s daughter had invited [two friends (71*) / all girls 
in her class (17) / four friends (12)] to her house. One of them 
was late. She had left her own house long ago. Ms Tsuda walked 
toward the girl‟s house and arrived at a level crossing, located at 
[200 (55*) / 500 (24) / 900 (21)] m from Ms Tsuda‟s house. There 
was indeed an accident involving a young girl. It turned out that 
the invited girl was not involved and was late because of a detour 
caused by the accident. 
S9- Helen, retired teacher, fainted as she was walking in the 
woods. She was found by [a retired couple (49) / a colleague 
teacher (26) / a member of her bridge club (25)] who called the 
rescue team. Helen would not have survived if she had reached the 
hospital [half an hour (77*) / one hour (16) / one hour and a 
half (7)] later. 
Note: Choices irrelevant to the present study are not shown here. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate percentages. Asterisk indicates 
significance (p < 0.001). Underlined numbers indicate model 
predictions. 
 
As shown in Table 1, most results were significant and 19 
of the 21 majority choices are congruent with the model‟s 
predictions. 
Analysis 
Some results are commented now in the light of the 
theory. 
Emotions: The intensity of the actual event, E(s1), was tested 
in story S2 (Lucas‟s waiting time), and in story S5 (duration 
of Florence‟s lost experiment). Unsurprisingly, majority 
choices make E(s1) maximal. In story S7, the third choice 
(number of points offered) influences Eh(s2): option “500”, 
l0 
 
s1 s2 
 
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which would lead to a smaller value of Eh(s2), was discarded 
by participants. 
Counterfactual simplicity: In story S8, counterfactual s2 
corresponds to the invited girl (G) being involved in the 
accident („it could have been her‟). Both majority choices in 
S8 tend to make s2 simpler, in agreement with equation (8). 
Participants clearly preferred that the invited girl (G) be one 
among 2 (71%) instead of one among 5 (17%) or 30 (12%), 
thus making the minimal description of G smaller by log2 n 
– 1 in comparison with n = 5 and n = 30. Similarly, by 
choosing the closest location (200m (55%)) instead of 500m 
or 900m for the counterfactual accident, they saved bits on 
C(s2) (log2(500/200) and log2(900/200)).  
Duration before near miss: In story S7, participants judged 
important that the hero hesitated four months (76%) instead 
of two months or two weeks before buying her/his 
telephone. We are in a case of unbounded near miss, and as 
predicted by equation (11), participants preferred the largest 
value for L. The same phenomenon explains the strong 
preference for the fact that Michèle has been playing for 6 
years (84%) in story S3 (in this case, the winning „sector‟ is 
s1 and it is reached, but the computation is identical). 
Proximity in near miss: Equation (11) predicts that emotion 
is maximum when one ends up close to the border between 
„winning‟ and „loosing‟ sectors ( small). Several stories 
represent near miss situations. In S1, the train accident 
would have been prevented if the signal had been sent 
k×10sec before (k = 1 preferred (59%)); In S4, the worker 
would not have been badly injured if the accident had 
occurred k days later (k = 1 preferred (75%)); in S7, the cost 
would have been saved if the purchase had been made k 
days later (k = 1 preferred (74%)); in S9, Helen would have 
died if her admission had been delayed by k×30min (k = 1 
preferred (77%)). 
Causal Thinking in Good or Bad Luck 
When confronted with events they perceive as (un)lucky, 
people tend to construct causal explanations for why these 
events happened (Pritchard & Smith, 2004). Causal thinking 
may produce counterfactuals by negating causes of the 
actual event, but also by enabling conditions for the 
counterfactual (Byrne, 2007). In what follows, we show 
how causal thinking can be accounted for within the ST 
framework. 
Suppose that a cause s3 can be found to explain s1. If we 
use (5) together with (7), we get: 
 L1 = Eh(s1) + U(s3) + Cw(s1|s3) (12) 
This relation shows that unexpected causes (U(s3) large) 
and materially complex causal links will tend to increase the 
feeling of (un)luck in the non-counterfactual case.  
If s4 is a counterfactual alternative to s3 that would have 
led to s2, we can compute L2 from s3. Using (8): 
 L2 = Eh(s2|s3) + U(s2) – Cwc(s2|s3) 
We may decompose Cwc(s2|s3): 
 L2 = Eh(s2|s3) + U(s2) – Cw(s2|s4) – Cwc(s4|s3) (13) 
The term Cwc(s4|s3) measures the mutability of s3 (Byrne, 
2007). Equation (13) can be used to find a cause that people 
will be likely to select as mutable. Let us check these 
predictions against the experimental results. 
Cause simplicity: Relation (12) predicts that simple causes 
(C(s3) small) will augment emotion since they are more 
unexpected. This is verified in story S5, where participants 
preferred the student responsible for the damage to be a 
neighbor‟s son (67%) instead of more complex individuals. 
In story S6, they preferred the virus to have been mentioned 
in the media (52%), rather than in a medical journal or a 
medical record where it would have been more complex to 
discriminate. Story S9 was also designed to test causal 
simplicity. We expected participants to reject option „a 
retired couple‟, as these individuals would be more complex 
to discriminate than in the two other options („a colleague 
teacher‟ and „a member of her bridge club‟). However, 
participants did not show the expected preference (49% vs. 
26%+25%).  
Causal link complexity: Relation (12) predicts that 
materially complex causal links (Cw(s1|s3) large) are more 
unexpected and thus will augment emotion. Story S6 has 
been designed to check this point. Participants did prefer 
Magalie‟s eventual success to go through a seven hour 
(79%) test to decide between 8 (66%) infectious agents, 
rather than easier alternatives. 
Causal link simplicity: Relation (13) conversely predicts 
that in counterfactual thinking, simple causal links will be 
preferred (Cw(s2|s4) small). In story S1, participants chose 
the shortest distance between the railway worker‟s faulty 
action and its effect (71%); in story S2, they preferred Lucas 
to lace up his shoe close to the station (71%). In both cases, 
the material simplicity of the causal link diminishes the 
counterfactual complexity from the cause („if he had sent 
the signal…‟, „if Lucas had not paused to lace his shoe…‟) 
to the counterfactual effect. We failed to show the same 
effect in story S5, where we expected participants to chose 
the simpler causal mechanism („broke all the boxes‟) instead 
of more complex ones („broke a bottle of formalin‟; „broke 
the nourishing device‟). The probable reason is that a simple 
causal link is preferable if one adopts Florence‟s 
counterfactual thinking, whereas a complex causal link is 
preferable if we only consider the newsworthiness of the 
story, what some participants seem to have done despite the 
instructions. 
Discussion 
The strong point of this study was to show the relevance of 
the notion of complexity in the study of the perception of 
luck. Many judgments about (un)lucky situations are not 
explained by variations of probability (even perceived 
probability) (Teigen, 1996). However, they vary in a 
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systematic way according to variations in complexity. We 
tried to connect people‟s attitude toward luck with 
predictions from Simplicity Theory, with some positive 
results. 
Another positive aspect of the study is to highlight several 
intervening factors that have gone unnoticed in previous 
studies, such as the simplicity of the counterfactual situation 
(story S8), the fact that proximity is measured on a relative 
scale (stories S3, S7), or the simplicity of causes (stories S5, 
S6). The model also provides quantitative laws, e.g. for the 
wheel of fortune near miss. 
We had two negative results in the experiment (story 5, 
choice 2 and story 9, choice 1). Note, however, that both 
consist in qualitative choices, which are more prone to 
complex interpretations by participants. The failure in S5 is 
likely to result from the bad design of the story; the failure 
in story 9 remains a mystery (perhaps the association due to 
word „retired‟ being used twice is sufficient in rapid readers 
to make the rescuers seem simple). 
In its current state, this theory of luck is not as simple as it 
should be. There are still some conceptual connections to be 
done that will make the link between equations and the 
processing of emotional intensities more transparent. The 
present account is meant as an attempt to depart from mere 
lists of factors and to outline an integrated model of the 
human ability to perceive luck in events. 
The research, initiated in the recent years, on the 
cognitive role of descriptive complexity has already 
produced valuable results. The model presented in this 
paper is meant as a contribution to this enterprise. The 
sensitivity to complexity differences, which is central to ST, 
seems to be a general law, which applies across modalities 
and at all levels of abstraction. Its importance in the 
processing of some emotions that are involved in decision 
processes, such as the feeling of being (un)lucky after the 
occurrence of an event (Loomes & Sugden 1982), should 
encourage further investigation in this domain. 
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